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EDUCATION AS A POSITIONAL GOOD: THE ROLE OF VOUCHERS 
Abstract 
People's satisfaction from some goods and services depends on 
their relative as distinct from their absolute position as 
consumers. Such items are called "positional goods", and a 
restriction of their supply in the situation of general income 
growth is conducive to expenditure escalation as in an arms race. 
If education is a positional good in this sense, arrangements are 
needed that will best prevent such an outcome. The introduction of 
education vouchers of a value egual to the average per capita 
public school expenditure, it is argued, will only hinder not help. 
This is because some recipients will be tempted to obtain more 
education with marginal additions to their vouchers from their own 
pockets. Vouchers are thus welfare reducing because they encourage 
rather than discourage "arms race" situations. Using a formal 
median voter model we show that concerns over possible escalation 
of expenditure will prompt a majority of voters to reject a 
universal voucher system. We examine, as an alternative, a 
selective voucher system that will remove the escalation problem. 
Under this system only low-income families will receive vouchers. 
We demonstrate that the median voter will favor such a selective 
voucher system provided that the voucher-induced increase in 
competition lowers costs and/or improves guality of education. 
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I. Introduction 
It has been observed that while there are many goods that are 
highly desirable in their own right, the supplies are such that 
only the wealthiest people can have them, and this regardless of 
the rate of growth of GNP. Hirsch (1976) , who was the first to 
describe these goods as "positional", explained that they involve 
people in becoming concerned primarily with their relative as 
distinct from their absolute position as consumers. Consumer 
satisfaction with health care services, for example, depends not 
just on the absolute quality of those services but also on their 
relative quality. Each person tends to compare his services and 
another's over a period of time. The restriction of their supply 
in a situation of general growth of income might trigger off an 
escalation of expenditures (like an arms race). Once somebody 
attempts to purchase more, somebody else will match, or more than 
match, the increased expenditure in a quest to maintain his/her 
relative consumption position. 
Does the phenomenon just described have implications for the 
methods of financing the social services? Some have suggested that 
"collectivization" of the supply of positional goods is preferable 
because it alone can be organized as to forestall the uncontrolled 
skyrocketing of expenditures. Thus switching from private fee-for-
service physicians to prepaid group practice, it is argued, can be 
expected to curtail explosive medical expenditures, bearing in mind 
evidence that shows that health outcomes do not improve 
significantly with increased expenditures. 
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A second example, and one on which we wish to concentrate, Is 
that of education. Those who view education as a positional good 
include Hirsch (1976), Jonathan (1990) and Frank (1995). The 
latter starts his discussion by referring to the finding of 
Hanushek (1986) that marginal increases in expenditures result in 
no significant marginal increases in educational achievement. This 
being so, those arrangements will be looked for that will be the 
most resistant to unnecessary expenditure accelerations (Frank, 
1995). 
The institution most capable of doing this, it is next argued, 
is the current "free" public school system. The reason is that 
this system imposes penalties on individual families who wish to 
buy more than average education for themselves. The chief penalty 
is that of forcing such families to "pay twice" for their education 
if they leave the public system. In other words, in order to buy 
more education they will have to resort to expensive private 
schooling and simultaneously forgo the "free" public schooling. 
Correspondingly, proposals to allocate to each family an education 
voucher of a value equal to the average per capita expenditure in 
the current public system are deemed inferior because some voucher 
recipients will then attempt to obtain more education by adding to 
the voucher from their own pockets. with the appearance of such 
"add ons", large numbers of families will emulate the practice so 
that each and every family will be troubled by the prospects of 
deterioration of their relative positions. When this concern 
spreads to the vast majority of families there will be irresistible 
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political pressure to increase the per capita expenditure in the 
public system. Once such pressure is successful, the expenditure 
escalation will be aggravated still further, and so on. 
We do not enter the debate here about the extent to which 
education is a positional good. Instead we accept the proposition 
for analytical purposes, or, in other words, we treat it as a 
maintained hypothesis. Our objective is to draw out the 
implications of the positional good hypothesis in terms of the 
effects of voucher systems1 and their political feasibility under 
a majority voting rule. Using a formal model we show that a 
universal voucher system under which every family with school-age 
children receives vouchers will indeed lead to the kind of "arms 
race" discussed in the literature. Such escalation of education 
expenditure, however, will involve only families with relatively 
high income. Low income families will not want to participate in 
the "arms race" and will be made worse off by a move to the 
universal voucher system. As a result, in a community where income 
is unevenly distributed, a majority of voters will reject such a 
motion.2 
1
 We are, of course, not the first to analyze the probable 
effects of introducing vouchers starting from a given equilibrium 
in traditional public school provision. Epple and Romano 1996(b), 
for instance, produce such an attempt but they are primarily 
interested in peer-group effects in education and study the 
introduction of universal vouchers exclusively. In contrast we 
focus on education as a positional good and on the differential 
effects of different types of vouchers. 
2
 Indeed, in the United States there were instances where such 
a motion was defeated in referenda (for example, 1993 California 
referendum for vouchers. See Epple and Romano 1996b). 
As a solution to the "arms race" problem, we consider a 
selective voucher system under which only the low income families 
are entitled to receive vouchers. We demonstrate that this system 
has the best of both worlds. First, it accomplishes what a voucher 
system is supposed to achieve, namely, it introduces competition 
into the education sector which leads to reductions in price and 
improvements in the quality of education. Second, because vouchers 
are awarded to only those who do not participate in the "arms 
race", the selective voucher system avoids the problem of 
escalating expenditure that will likely occur under a universal 
voucher system. Therefore, a majority of voters will prefer a 
selective (pro-poor) voucher system over a universal voucher 
system. 
The selective voucher system is beginning to receive 
empirical testimony in the current literature. West (1996) finds 
recently established selective pro-poor voucher plans operating in 
Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, the U.S.A., Puerto Rico and the U.K. 
Intellectual support, meanwhile, appears also to be growing. 
Vouchers to enable low income families exclusively to gain 
increased access to private schools are advocated, for instance, by 
Oakland (1994), West (1994) and Becker (1995). Oakland maintains 
that a case can be made for some redistribution generally in the 
provision of social services, but suggests that it is better 
accomplished by extending the welfare system to provide the poor 
with vouchers for selective government services such as education 
than using lump-sum and matching grants based on tax base 
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characteristics. Becker's recommendation is based partly on fiscal 
considerations, "but mainly because the bottom quarter or so of the 
population are most in need of better education" (p. 11) . in 
addition, Becker quotes studies demonstrating, not only the 
superior performance of private over public schools, but also the 
finding that "students from disadvantaged backgrounds tend to gain 
the most from attending private schools". This fact, he observes, 
is not surprising "in light of the more extensive choices available 
to middle class and rich students" (p. 12). 
Despite such arguments for a selective voucher system, so far 
there has been no formal analysis on the subject. The present 
paper accordingly attempts a rigorous theoretical investigation, in 
the light of the positional good concept, and one that may throw 
light on the recent emergence of the selective voucher system 
worldwide. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II analyzes 
government provision of positional goods/services in terms of a 
democratic political model. It assumes (a) that education is a 
positional good, (b) that education is a single voting issue, and 
(c) that the preferences that are met are primarily those of the 
median voter. In this section we assume the supply (cost) side of 
education is fixed. Section III considers the effects of switching 
to vouchers, first under a system of universal vouchers and second 
under a selective system wherein only low income families qualify 
to be recipients. Section IV drops the assumption that the supply 
side of education is fixed and examines the cost implications of 
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vouchers challenging the public school via new and effective 
competition. Section V offers our main conclusions. 
II. The Model 
Consider a community in which individuals have different 
income levels. Income is distributed in the interval [Y, Y] with 
a probability density function 0(Y). The average income level in 
this community can be expressed as Ya=J/Y0(Y) dY. Distribution of 
income is such that Ya is greater than the median income level, 
denoted by Ym. People have identical, homothetic tastes. Each 
individual consumes two goods: education and a numeraire good (x). 
The quantity of education can be measured by a single index, e, 
that takes into consideration both the quantity and the quality of 
education. A key feature of this model is that education is 
assumed to be a positional good. We follow Frank's (1985) seminal 
work on positional goods and assume that the utility function of an 
individual takes the form U = U(e,x,R(e)), where R(e) is an index 
measuring the percentile ranking of e in the population. Let f (e) 
denote the probability density function of e. Then R(e)=Jef(z)dz. 
It follows that R» (e) = f(e) > 0. Each individual's ranking, R(e) , 
depends on the amount of spending on education by this individual 
as well as the amount of spending by all other individuals in this 
community. Following Frank, we shall make the following Cournot-
type assumption: when choosing his own spending on education, each 
individual takes the spending of other individuals as fixed. 
The assumption of homothetic preferences implies that 
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U(e,x,R(e)) = U(V(e,x),R(e)) (1) 
where V(e,x) is concave and homogenous of degree one in (e,x) . 
Furthermore, Uv > 0, UR>0, Uw < 0, Uj^ < 0, and U^ > 0. We assume 
that U(V(e,x),R(e)) exhibits diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution between e and x. 
The price of the numeraire good x is normalized to 1. The 
price of a unit of e is denoted by p. We assume that p is the same 
for public and private schooling.3 In this section and next, we 
assume that p remains constant as the community moves to a voucher 
system. 
The focus of this analysis is on various regimes under which 
education can be provided. Our starting point is the public school 
system currently adopted in most jurisdictions in North America. 
Under this system, public schools are financed through tax revenues 
and, therefore, are "free" to individuals. At the same time, an 
individual has the option of going to a private school but he/she 
has to pay the full price of the private education out of his/her 
after-tax income. This is sometimes described as "paying twice" 
for education. For ease of presentation, we shall call this 
current public school system the PP regime. We shall then analyze 
what would happen if the community moved from PP to each of two 
modified regimes that involve vouchers. The first is a universal 
voucher system (the UV regime) under which all families and school-
3
 In reality there is evidence to the contrary (see Toma 1996 
and West 1996), but this assumption serves to simplify our 
analysis. 
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age children qualify for vouchers. The second is a selective 
voucher system (the SV regime) under which only low-income 
individuals qualify for vouchers. All others in the school-age 
population are entitled to the conventional public schooling. They 
can also choose private schooling if they are prepared to "pay 
twice". We focus on the two issues: first, what will happen if 
this education system is reformed through the introduction of 
vouchers? Second, will a voucher system defeat the PP regime under 
the majority voting rule? 
We assume that public education is financed by a flat tax on 
income, and that the level of public expenditure on education is 
determined by the majority voting rule. It is well known that 
under the PP regime a majority voting equilibrium may not exist 
(Epple and Romano 1996c, 79) . In this paper, however, the PP 
regime is the reference point to which the UV regime and SV regime 
are compared. Therefore, we assume that, as the status quo, 
education is provided under a PP regime that is the outcome of the 
majority voting. To make the problem interesting, we assume that 
not all people use public education at the status quo. 
Epple and Romano (1996c) contains a comprehensive analysis on 
the equilibrium under the PP regime. Here we adapt part of their 
analysis to our model and establish a number of basic facts about 
the PP regime that are necessary for our later analysis of 
vouchers. Let t be the tax rate on income and g be the amount of 
public education available to each person attending. Then the 
utility of a person who uses public education can be written as 
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U(V(g,(l-t)Y), R(g)). Then 
M, t) _
 Uv^^)Ve(gr(^-t)Y)+UR(VfR)R/(g) 
YUv(V,R)Vx(g,(l-t)Y) 
represents the slope of this person's indifference curve in the 
(g,t) space. Diminishing marginal rate of substitution implies 
that dM/dg < 0 and dM/dt < 0. Following Epple and Romano (1996c), 
we focus on the following two cases:4 
a) dM/dY < 0 (Slope Declining in Income, or SDI); 
b) dM/dY > 0 (Slope Rising in Income, or SRI). 
For a given level of public education g and given tax rate t, 
some voters choose to go to the public schools while others 
private schools. It can be shown that this choice depends on the 
income level of each individual. 
Lemma l.5 Given the values of t and g, there exists a critical 
Y (g,t) such that individuals whose Y<Yp(g,t) use public education 
and individuals whose Y>Y (g,t) use private education. 
Furthermore, dYp/dg>0 and dYp/dt>0. 
Therefore, given g and t the fraction of individuals in this 
community who use the public education system is JYYp(g,t)0(Y) dY. 
(To simplify notation we will drop the Y under the integral sign 
4
 See Epple and Romano (1996c) for a discussion on the 
implications and empirical relevance of these two alternative 
assumptions. 
5
 The proofs of all the lemmas and propositions in this paper 
are presented in Appendix. 
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from now on.) Notice that g and t are related through the 
government budget constraint: pg/YP^,t)0(Y)dY = tYa> 0n the left-
hand side of the budget constraint is the per capita expenditure on 
public education and on the right-hand side the per capita tax 
revenue. From the budget constraint we can solve t as a function 
of g: t=t(g). Then we can define a new function Yp(g) = Yp(g,t(g)) 
and express the per capita expenditure on public education as a 
function of g only: pgJYP(g)0(Y)dY. Obviously, as g increases, the 
per capita expenditure on public education will increase as well. 
Define the increase in the per capita expenditure associated with 
a marginal increase in g as "the marginal cost of public 
education", MC(g). Then 
MC 
d[pgf7P(g)0(Y)dY]
 r ( , , (3) 
(gr) =
 ag- =PJ *(y>dy + Psr0(yp(g))Yp(g) { } 
We assume that MC(g) is nondecreasing in g. This assumption 
implies that MC(g) < p. Intuitively, if g were so high that 
everyone uses the public education (i.e., if Y (g) = Y) the 
IT 
marginal cost of public education would be equal to the price of 
education p. For a smaller g, not everyone uses the public 
education system, in which case the assumption of nondecreasing 
marginal cost implies that MC(g) < p. 
Differentiation of the government budget constraint 
pgJYP(g>0(Y)dY = tYa yields: dt/dg = MC(g)/Ya. in other words, an 
increase in g by one unit has to be accompanied by an increase in 
the tax rate by MC(g)/Ya. 
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Consider the median voter who has chosen the current level of 
g under the PP regime. Let Yc denote the income of this median 
voter. Then the identity of the median voter depends on the sign 
of dM/dY. If SDI is satisfied, an individual's most preferred g is 
a monotonic function of Y, in which case the individual with the 
median income is the median voter. On the other hand, if SRI is 
true, both low income individuals and high income individuals 
prefer a small or zero g while individuals in the middle of income 
spectrum prefer a large g, a situation that Epple and Romano 
(1996c) characterize as "ends against middle." In this case the 
median voter is someone with an income less than the median income. 
Lemma 2. Assume that a majority voting equilibrium exists. Then Yc 
= Ym if SDI is satisfied, and Yc < Ym if SRI is satisfied. 
In what follows, we develop a diagrammatic illustration of the 
equilibrium under the PP regime. The diagrams will also be used in 
Section III to illustrate the effects of vouchers. 
Let g* and t* be the level of public education and tax rate 
prevailing under the PP regime. Then g* and t* are the most 
preferred choice of the median voter. In other words, g and t 
are the solution to the problem: 
max
 g/t U(V(g,x),R(g)) (4) 
subject to pgJYP(g)0(Y)dY = tYa and x = (l-t)Yc (5) 
Combining the two constraints, we obtain: 
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+ (Yc/Ya)pgJrp(g)0(Y)dY = Yc (6) 
The first-order condition to this problem implies: 
U7iV,R)Vel9*.x*)+°Rlv*R)R & > = I^MC(g*) (7) 
UvVx(g*,x*) Yc 
The left-hand side of (7) represents the marginal rate of 
substitution between e and x when e is equal to g* and is funded 
through tax revenue. The right-hand side is the "price" of g to 
the median voter. To see this, recall that tax rate has to be 
increased by MC(g)/Ya in order to finance a marginal increase in g. 
To the median voter, this increase in tax rate translates into an 
increased tax burden by the amount of (Yc/Ya)MC (g) . Notice that 
(Yc/Ya)MC(g) < p because Yc < Ya and MC(g) < p. 
The solution to this first-order condition is illustrated in 
Figure 1. Ic is the median voter's indifference curve that goes 
through the point B. The slope of this indifference curve at e=g* 
is given by the left-hand side of (7). 
If the median voter had chosen to use a private school, he 
would have to finance his consumption of both e and x out of his 
after-tax income. Thus he would face a budget constraint: 
x + pe = (l-t*)Yc. (8) 
This is represented by line HJ in Figure 1. since, by assumption, 
g* is positive in equilibrium, HJ must be everywhere below the 
indifference curve lc. (Otherwise, the median voter would be 
better off by using privately provided education, in which case he 
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should have chosen g=0) . The second line in Figure 1, line DKBF, is 
parallel to line HJ and goes through point B. It represents the 
equation 
x + pe = (l-t*)Yc + pg*. (9) 
Equation (9) would be the budget constraint of the median voter if 
he were free to spend an income of (l-t*)Yc + pg*. The vertical 
distance between line HJ and line DKBF is the per capita public 
expenditure on education pg*. Since the slope of line DKBF is -p, 
the length of the horizontal line HB is exactly equal to the units 
of public education purchased: g*. Notice that at point B the 
slope of DKBF is steeper than that of Ic. 
Lemma 1 implies that Y (g*) is the critical income level that 
divides individuals who use public education and individuals who 
use private education. It is clear that Yp(g*) >YC. The choice of 
the individual with this critical income level is illustrated in 
Figure 2. If he uses the public education, he will consume g* 
units of education for "free" and his utility level is given by the 
indifference curve Ipp. On the other hand, if he uses private 
education, he will purchase e* units out of his after-tax income 
(l-t)YD(g*). As shown in Figure 2, the indifference curve that 
goes through the point (g*, (1-t)Yp(g*) ) , Ipp, is tangent to the 
private education budget line x + pe = (l-t)Yp(g*), implying that 
he is indifferent between either consuming g* units of public 
education or e* units of private education. Diminishing marginal 
rate of substitution implies that the slope of Ipp at g* is greater 
than p, the slope of Ipp at e*. 
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For an individual with income level Y' > Yp(g*), a portion of 
the private education budget line x + pe = (l-t*)Y' will lie above 
the indifference curve that goes the point (g*, (l-t*)Y') . To him, 
private education is the better alternative. 
III. Vouchers 
In this section we consider the effects of modifying the PP regime 
to a regime that allows education vouchers. We shall first 
consider a universal voucher system (the UV regime) under which 
every family with school-age children is entitled to vouchers. 
Then we shall propose a selective voucher system (the SV regime) 
under which only low income families receive vouchers. Under both 
voucher regimes those entitled to a voucher have the option to 
supplement it with additional purchase of education. We assume 
that a decision to switch regimes is made through a two-stage 
voting process. At stage 1, voters decide whether to switch from 
the PP regime to a voucher system (either UV or SV regime) . If the 
outcome is "yes," they proceed to stage 2 and decide the values of 
g and t under the voucher system. In the following analysis of 
each voucher system, we shall begin by studying the possible 
effects on voters of different income levels should a switch to the 
voucher system be made. Once we know how different voters would 
fare under the voucher system, it is easy to predict the outcome of 
stage 1 voting. 
III.l UV Regime 
The UV regime differs from the PP regime in at least two aspects. 
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First, the UV regime gives individuals more choices in the kinds of 
schools they want to attend. They can spend their vouchers in the 
private schools or public schools. This will increase competition 
among schools and will tend to improve the efficiency of schools. 
We shall explore the implications of this aspect in the next 
section. Second, the UV regime is universal in the sense that 
every family with school-age children is entitled to a voucher. 
Our analysis in this section will focus on this second aspect. 
Before we present the results from our formal model, it is 
instructive to conduct a heuristic analysis on the UV regime using 
Figure 1 and Figure 2. In this diagrammatic approach, we consider 
a restricted version of the UV system where only those who were 
previously using the public education will be entitled to vouchers. 
In other words, those who were previously using private schools, or 
can be regarded as the "incumbent" private school population, are 
for now administratively precluded from the voucher option. (This 
assumption will later be dropped.) Under this restricted version 
of the UV regime the government budget constraint remains the same 
as under the PP regime, and at the tax rate t*, the value of the 
voucher will be exactly equal to pg*. 
As will be shown in Proposition 1 the median voter under the 
UV regime is not necessarily the median voter under the PP regime. 
For simplicity, in this diagrammatic analysis we restrict our 
attention to the case where the median voters under these two 
regimes have the same income. In Figure 1 the value of the 
voucher, pg*, can be represented by the length HD. Under the UV 
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regime, the median voter can use the voucher to obtain the first g* 
units and pay p dollars for each additional unit beyond g*. His 
budget constraint under this system is presented by HBF in Figure 
1. Recall that BF is steeper than Ic at point B. As a result, any 
point on the segment BF (not including B) will generate a lower 
utility level than at point B. The median voter will not buy any 
supplement even though he is allowed to do so. The assumption of 
identical and homothetic preferences then implies that individuals 
with lower income levels will not purchase any supplement, either. 
Intuitively, these individuals do not want to purchase any 
supplements because their income levels are below the average 
income Ya (see Lemma 2) . The public education they receive is 
subsidized by the individuals with above-average income. As a 
result, their marginal rate of substitution at g* is lower than the 
true price of education p. Under a voucher system, the median 
voter faces the true price of education at the margin. Hence he 
has no incentive to increase his consumption of education. In 
fact, he would want to reduce it if he could sell a portion of his 
voucher at price p (see the BK line in Figure 1). 
Let Yuv be the income level that divides those who buy 
supplements and those who do not. The preceding discussion implies 
that Yuv > Yc. The curve Iuv in Figure 2 is an indifference curve 
of the individual with income Yuv. it is tangent to the budget 
line x + pe = (l-t*)Yuv + Pg* at e = g*. This individual has the 
highest income level among those who do not purchase any 
supplements. Individuals with a higher income want to consume more 
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than the g* units purchased with the voucher and hence purchase 
supplements. Recall that Ipp in Figure 2 is an indifference curve 
of the individual with income YT.(g*) and that the slope of l__ at 
tr PP 
g* is greater than p. The assumption of identical, homothetic 
preferences implies that Iuv is below Ipp, which, in turn, implies 
that Yuv < Yp(g*). 
Therefore, individuals with income levels higher than Yuv but 
lower than Yp(g*) would increase their expenditure on education and 
hence switch from public education to private education if the UV 
system were introduced. The escalation of expenditure by these 
individuals would affect the behaviour of both low income and high 
income individuals. Notice that in the discussion so far we have 
implicitly assumed that the positional good index R remains 
constant. However, as those middle income individuals increase 
their expenditure beyond Pg*, the percentile ranking of those who 
continue to consume g*, measured by R(g*) , is lower. This will make 
these individuals whose income is below Yuv worse off. On the other 
hand, as more families switch to private schools, the percentile 
ranking of those who use private education under the PP regime, 
(individuals whose income is above Yp(g*)), would drop unless they 
increase their expenditure on education as well. As a consequence, 
there would be an "arms race" among those with relatively high 
income levels (Y>YUV) as they increase their expenditure in an 
attempt to maintain their relative rankings.6 
5It may be argued that privately volunteered supplements ("add 
ons") to vouchers could be legally prohibited, in which case the 
"arms race" fear would be resolved. Administratively, however, 
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These conclusions are confirmed by our analysis of the formal 
model. In the formal analysis we no longer assume that vouchers 
are restricted to previous users of public education. Instead, we 
consider a truly universal voucher system in which everyone is 
entitled to a voucher. This means that a given amount of education 
expenditure has to be shared equally among all individuals of the 
community. It also means that individuals who were using private 
education receive a windfall in the form of vouchers. As a result, 
the government budget constraint now changes to: pg = tYa, which 
implies t=pg/Ya. We shall use s to denote the supplement purchased 
by an individual. Then an individual's most preferred g is solved 
from 
maxg>0,s>0 U(V(g+s,Y-l21-ps) ,R(g+s) ) (10) 
*a 
From this optimization problem we can determine the relationship 
between an individual's most preferred g and his income level, and 
thus the identity of the median voter under the UV regime. Let Y 
denote the income of the median voter under the UV regime. Recall 
that the income of the median voter under the PP regime is Y 
Proposition 1. 
Under the UV regime the median voter has the same income as the 
median voter under the PP regime (i.e., Ycv = YC) if SDI holds, but 
his income is lower than that of the median voter under the PP 
regime (i.e., Ycv < Yc) if SRI holds. 
this would be extremely costly and diffimn- ^~~ • -.-> 
is known that, at the margin, parents can,
 and' do ^ substltute"?^^ 
own private donations for tuition fees. (Blewettfifss!? 
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Therefore, under the UV regime the median voter has an income 
level equal to Ym if SDI is true and an income level less than Ym 
if SRI is true. Since Ym is lower than the average income Ya, the 
median voter's income is less than Ya as well. As a result, 
Proposition 2. 
Under the UV system, individuals whose income levels are less than 
or equal to that of the median voter (Y < Ycv) will not supplement 
their vouchers (i.e., s = 0). 
From the government budget constraint we can see that a 
marginal increase in g has to be financed by an increase in tax 
rate by p/Ya. To the median voter, this translates into an 
increase in tax by pYcv/Ya. Recall that under the PP regime the 
"price" of g to this voter is (Ycv/Ya)MC(g) . Since MC(g*) < p, the 
voter faces a higher "price" of g under the UV regime than under 
the PP regime. This is not surprising considering that under the 
UV regime an increase in g will be applicable to all individuals 
rather than only those with income less than Y (g*) . The voter 
responds to this increase in the "price" of g in the following way. 
Proposition 3. 
Under the UV regime, the level of public education would be lower 
and the tax rate would be higher than under the PP regime, i.e., 
9uv < 9* a n d fcuv > fc*-
The next proposition pertains to the situation illustrated in 
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Figure 2. 
Proposition 4. 
There exists a critical income level Yuv such that individuals 
whose Y > Yuv supplement their voucher and individuals whose Y < Yuv 
do not. Furthermore, Ycv < Yuv < Yp(g*) . 
Propositions 3 and 4 imply that low income individuals with Y 
< Yuv will lose from the switch from the PP regime to the UV 
regime. Under the UV regime, they will pay more tax yet receive 
less public education in return. Their relative position, measured 
by R(g) , will worsen as well because fewer people will use the 
public education. Therefore, if asked to choose between the PP 
regime and the UV regime, individuals with income less than or 
equal to Yuv will unambiguously vote against the switch from the PP 
regime to the UV regime. 
The choice of those with higher income, however, is not as 
obvious. The high income individuals who use private education 
under the PP regime (whose Y > Yp(g*)) no longer have to "pay 
twice" for education and they receive a windfall in the form of 
vouchers. However, this windfall is dissipated, at least in part, 
by the "arms race" induced by the increased spending of middle-
income individuals (those with an income between Y and Y (g*)). 
As a result, it is not clear whether they will join the low income 
individual in voting against the switch to uv system. To 
individuals whose income falls between Yuv and Yp(g*), the UV regime 
allows them to choose the exact amount of e that would maximize 
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their utility. This gain is, again, (at least partially) offset by 
the "arms race". 
Proposition 5. 
A motion to replace the PP regime by the UV regime will be rejected 
by a majority of voters if either a) SDI holds, or b) SRI holds and 
Y > Y . 
The possibility of escalating expenditure caused by a switch 
to the UV system is discussed in Frank (1996) . Using a diagram 
similar to Figure 1 he argues that a voucher system will lead to 
increased expenditure on education for many families, "possibly the 
vast majority of families"(page 182). Frank reaches this 
conclusion by assuming that a representative individual faces a 
situation represented by point K (rather than point B) in Figure 1. 
Our analysis reveals this assumption is not appropriate if we 
interpret Frank's representative individual as the median voter.7 
The median voter has no desire to increase his consumption of e 
after the UV regime is adopted. In fact in equilibrium he will 
reduce his consumption of education. Despite this observation, 
Frank is still correct in his contention that, given his 
assumptions, a move to the UV regime will trigger an "arms race" in 
education expenditure. 
Here we push our analysis further than that of Frank. We show 
that the concern over expected escalating expenditure will prompt 
7
 A representative agent is the agent whose choices are the 
same as the ones chosen by the community as a whole. In our model 
the median voter plays precisely this role. 
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the median voter to reject the move from the PP regime to the UV 
regime. 
III. 2 SV Regime 
Consider now a selective voucher system where only low income 
individuals are entitled to receive vouchers. Here low income is 
defined as the level below Yc, the income level of the median voter 
under the PP regime. From the above analysis, the effects of this 
SV regime are easy to ascertain. Because Yc < Yp(g*) , users of 
private education do not receive vouchers. As a result, the 
government budget constraint is not affected by a move from the PP 
regime to such a SV regime. Furthermore, by restricting vouchers 
to low income individuals, individuals who would have engaged in an 
"arms race" do not receive vouchers under the SV regime. Hence a 
move from the PP regime to the SV regime will not lead to any 
change in expenditure or tax rate. This implies that R(g*), the 
ranking of those with Y < Yc, is not affected by this change. They 
will continue to consume the g* units purchased with the voucher. 
Proposition 6. 
Given the price p, the SV regime is tied with the PP regime under 
the majority voting rule. 
Notice that given the assumption of constant price p, everyone 
is as well off under the SV regime as under the PP regime. In 
other words, there is no gain from moving from the PP regime to the 
SV regime. This, of course, will not be true if the increased 
competition brought about by the voucher system brings down the 
25 
price of education (or improves quality) . We discuss this issue in 
next section. 
IV. The Production Side 
In the above analysis, we have assumed that the supply side of the 
education system is fixed. Hence the price of eduction, p, is 
assumed to be constant before and after the introduction of voucher 
system. In this section we discuss the effects of a voucher system 
on the supply side. We view schools as firms that produce output 
(education) using a production technology subject to decreasing 
returns to scale. We assume that the public school and the private 
school have the same cost structure. 
Under PP regime, the public schools as a whole have a monopoly 
power over the segment of the market in which individuals' demand 
for education is less than or equal to g* units (see Figure 1) . 
This is because public education is "free" to everyone in the 
community. Private schooling, on the other hand, has to be paid 
through after-tax income. As a result, private schools can only 
supply the residual market in which buyers want more than g* units 
of education. Since the public schools have a market share of more 
than 50 percent, it is reasonable to assume that they are the 
price-setters in the market. The private schools, on the other 
hand, are price followers in the sense that they take the price as 
given when deciding their output. We view this situation as 
similar to the Stackelberg leadership model where the public 
schools form a cartel and act as a price leader while the private 
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schools form a competitive fringe. It is clear that in this 
situation the equilibrium price will be above marginal cost. 
One consequence of the voucher system is the introduction of 
competition into the market segment previously monopolized by 
public schools. Now private schools can compete with public 
schools to supply g* units paid for by the vouchers. The increased 
competition will bring down the price of education p.8 This will 
bring benefits to all consumers of education. It can be shown that 
in equilibrium, the amount of education provided by the public 
funds will increase (g > g*) and the tax rate will decrease (t < 
t*) . Clearly, the individuals who use public education will 
benefit from such a change. The users of private education also 
benefit from this change due to lower price and lower tax rate. 
A move from the PP regime to the UV regime, will bring down p. 
But to the median voter this effect is partially or even completely 
offset by the negative effects of an "arms race" among the high 
income individuals. A move to the SV regime, on the other hand, 
does not have this second negative effect. Therefore our next 
proposition logically follows: 
Proposition 7. 
Recall that e is an index th^ +- -h=*v^ ^ A X. 
both quality and quantity of educatfon^A falltoinc™ld«:»tion of 
be interpreted both as a fall in the cost S
 P 2 *- P r i C S P C a n 
increase in the quality of education I f r f , 1 0 ^ ** M 
likely that a fall in p will manifest itse?? # ' t £ ^ " ^ 
improvement in quality. New empirical evirt™« t i. f o r m o f 
in the 1990s showing that the introduction £** ^ P u b l i s h e d 
increased use of private schooling leads t n ? competition via 
performance. (See Couch et al? 1993* %^°^P^>^o S c h ° o 1 
Borland and Howsen, 1996.) ' Mlnter-Hoxby, 1994; and 
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Assuming that a voucher system can be expected to reduce the price 
of education, the SV regime will defeat the PP regime, and it will 
defeat the UV regime if a) SDI is true, or if b) SRI is true and 
Y > Y 
The SV regime has the best of both worlds. It introduces 
competition into the education sector, and hence reduces the price 
and improves the quality of education. At the same time, it avoids 
the positional good problem of escalating expenditure that will 
likely occur under the UV regime.9 
V. Conclusion 
Our model predicts that, assuming education is a positional 
good, the median voter will reject a proposed move from the current 
system of public plus private schools (PP) to a regime of vouchers 
that are universally available to families with school-age children 
(UV) . The median voter will be indifferent to any proposal for a 
selective voucher (SV) available only to low income families, but 
only if we assume that production costs can be expected to remain 
fixed. Because, however, the selective voucher will allow private 
9
 Since the introduction of the SV regime will be an efficient 
move that reduces the price and improves the quality of education, 
the question arises why the median voter approved of the 
inefficient alternative in the first place. One answer may be 
offered in terms of initially imperfect voter information. The 
public monopoly in education took time to develop, as did the 
growth of the education bureaucracy and its constant pressure for 
consolidation. 
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schools to compete for low income students traditionally in public 
schools, the public school monopoly will be weakened and costs will 
come down all round (and/or quality will improve all round) . The 
median voter in this situation will be in favor of the adoption of 
SV. He will be opposed to a universal voucher, however, because, 
despite the fact that the new competition will reduce price, this 
effect will be counterbalanced by the negative effects of an "arms 
race" among high income families. The SV, in other words, avoids 
the positional good problem of escalating expenditures that do 
little or nothing to increase output, whereas the UV regime fails 
to avoid it. The SV regime could result in higher expenditures but 
this time as a welfare gain in the form of greater output via 
increased competition. 
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Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
Given the values of g and t, an individual with income Y can either 
use public education and consume the bundle (g, (l-t)Y), or use 
private education and consume the utility-maximizing bundle 
associated with the disposable income (l-t)Y. Hence his choice of 
education system is determined by comparing U(V(g, (l-t)Y), R(g)) 
with maxe U(V(e, (l-t)Y-pe), R(e)). Using the envelope theorem we 
can show that the latter increases with Y. Let Y (g,t) be the 
income of the individual who is indifferent between the public and 
private education, that is, Yp(g,t) satisfies 
U(V(g, (l-t)Yp) ,R{g) ) = maxe C7(V(e, (1-t) Yp-pe) ,R(e) ) . (Al) 
Then individuals with Y<Yp(g,t) prefers public education to the 
private education and individuals with Y>Y (g,t) prefers private 
education to the public education. 
To prove that dYp/dg > 0 and 3Y /dt > 0, consider the 
individual with income Yp(g,t) . Let e* be the solution to the 
maximization problem on the right-hand side of (Al) . It is obvious 
from equation (Al) that e* > g. We will use U(e*) and V(e*) to 
denote the values of U(-) and V(-) when he chooses private 
education and U and V to denote the values of the same functions 
when he chooses public education. Since Yp(l-t)-pe* < Yp(l-t) and 
e* > g, the marginal utility of x is higher if he chooses private 
education than if he chooses public education, i.e., Uv(e )Vx(e ) 
> UVV . Comparative statics on equation (Al) reveals that 
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dYp _ Uvve+VRX' (g) > o ( A 2 ) 
~W (l-t)[Uv(e*)Vx(e*)-UvVx] 
and dYp/at = Yp/(l-t) >0. 
Proof of Lemma 2. 
To determine the identity of the median voter, we must find out how 
each individual's utility-maximizing value of g is related to his 
income. Obviously, an individual's most preferred g is determined 
by comparing his maximum utility from using the public education 
maxg U(V(g,Y-JLpgj ^9)^{Y)dY) ,R{g) ) (A3) 
with the utility from using the private education 
maxg,e U(V(e,Y-^pgJrP(g)0(Y)dY-pe),i?(e)) (A4) 
First, we establish that high income individuals prefer g=0 to 
g>0. Consider the individual who has the highest income in this 
community, Y. From Lemma 1 it is clear that if he should choose 
the public education, his most preferred g would be large enough 
that everyone would use public education, i.e., JYp(9>0(Y) dY = 1. 
Then p(Y/Ya)JYP(9)0(Y)dY > p; in other words, public education is 
more costly than private education to this individual. Meanwhile, 
his top income level ensures that R(e) = i should he choose private 
education (g=0 and e>0). Therefore, private education and hence 
g=0 is the most preferred choice of this individual. By continuity, 
there exists an income level Y « y) such
 t h a t t h e m o s t p r e f e r r e d 
g is equal to 0 for all individuals with Y > Y. 
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Second, we demonstrate that Y > Ya. We achieve this by 
showing that those with Y < Ya prefers g>0 to g=o. Consider again 
the optimization problems (A3) and (A4) . For an individual with Y 
< Ya, (Y/Ya)pJYP(9)0(Y)dY < p and R(g) > R(e) (because Yn(g) > Y) . 
The value of (A3) is always greater than the value of (A4) . The 
same is true for an individual with Y = Ya because p/YP<9>0(Y) dY ^  
P/ R(9) ^ R(e), and at least one of these two holds with strict 
inequality. Therefore, the most preferred g's of all individuals 
with Y > Ya must satisfy g > 0. 
Third, we show that, among those who prefer g>0 to g=0, an 
individual • s most preferred g decreases with his income if SDI 
holds but increases with his income if SRI holds. The utility of 
these individuals is represented by (A3). The first order 
condition to this maximization problem is YaM(g, (pg/Ya) J"Yp(g)0(Y) dY) 
- MC(g) = 0, where M(g,t) is defined in equation (2) and MC(g) in 
equation (3). Comparative statics on this condition reveals that 
dg_ Ya(dM/dY) (A5) 
~&* MC1 (g) -Ya (dM/dg) 
The denominator is positive because 3M/dg < 0, dK/dt < 0 and 
MC'(g) >0. The sign of dg/dY is negative if dM/dY < 0 (SDI) and 
positive if dM/dY > 0 (SRI). 
Therefore, if SDI holds, an individual's most preferred g 
decreases with income, with g=0 for the individuals with very high 
income. In this case, the median voter is the individual with the 
median income, i.e., Yc = Ym. On the other hand, if SRI holds, an 
individual's most preferred g increases with income for those who 
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prefer g>0 to g=0. In this case, a majority voting equilibrium may 
not exists because individuals whose income is between Ya and Y may 
have two local maxima to their utility maximization problem, g>0 in 
one and g=0 in the other. To rule out this possibility and ensure 
the existence of an equilibrium we have to assume that individuals 
with Y > Ya has a unique most preferred g. Then we can re-
interpret Y as the income level that divides those who prefer g > 
0 and those who prefer g = 0. The median voter, thus, has an income 
level Yc defined by JyYc0(Y)dY + JYY0(Y)dY = 1/2. Clearly, Yc < Ym. 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Again we consider each individual's most preferred g. The first-
order conditions to the maximization problem (10) presented in the 
text are 
|H = UvVe+URR'-UvVxp(Y/Ya) < 0; g>0; |^g=0 (A6) 
|§ = UvVe+URRf-UvVxp < 0; s>0; |^s=0 (A7) 
For an individual with Y > Ya, p(Y/Ya) > p. The above two 
conditions imply that g=0 and s>0. Conversely, for an individual 
with Y < Ya, (A6) and (A7) imply that g>0 and s=0. 
Consider those whose Y < Ya and hence whose optimal g>0. 
Condition (A6) implies that YaM(g, pg/yj - p = 0. Comparative 
statics on this condition reveals that 
dg _ _dM/dY 
~dY "dtf/dg (A8) 
35 
The denominator is negative. Then the sign of dg/dY is negative if 
dM/dY < 0 (SDI) and positive if dM/dY > 0 (SRI) . 
Therefore, if SDI holds, an individual's most preferred g 
decreases with his income, with g=0 for the individuals with very 
high income. The median voter has an income Ycv = Ym, which is the 
same as under the PP regime. 
On the other hand, if SRI holds, an individual's most 
preferred g increases with his income for those who prefer g>0 to 
g=0. In this case, individuals at the two ends of the income 
distribution want a small or zero g but individuals in the middle 
prefer a large g. The median voter has an income level defined by 
JYYcv0(Y)dY + JYaY0(Y)dY = 1/2. Recall from the proof of Lemma 2 
that Yc is defined by JYYc0(Y)dY + JYY0(Y)dY = 1/2 and that Y > Ya. 
It follows that Ycv < Yc < Ym. 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
Proposition 1 implies that Ycv < Ya. Conditions (A6) and (A7) 
implies that the median voter will choose s = 0. Thus, dU/ds < 0 
when Y = Y . It can be shown, by differentiating (A7) , that 
d2U/3Yds > 0. Therefore, 3U/ds < 0 for individuals whose Y < Yc. 
They will also choose s = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Since S-M/at < 0 and JYp<9>0(Y)dY < 1, M(g, (pg/Ya) JYp<s>0(Y)dY) > 
M(g, pg/Y ) for the same income Y. If SRI is true, Yc > Ycv, in 
which case M(g, (pg/Ya) JYp<9)0(Y)dY) evaluated at Yc is still 
greater than M(g, pg/Ya) evaluated at Ycv. On the other hand, 
recall from the proof of Lemma 2 that YaM(g, (pg/Ya) JYp<9>0(Y)dY) = 
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MC(g) at g = g\ and from the Proof of Proposition 1 that M(g, 
pg/Ya) = p at g = guv. Since MC(g) < p and dM/dg < 0, to satisfy 
these two equations it is necessary that g > guv. 
To prove that t* < tuv, let g' be the solution to the equation 
YaM(g, (pg/Ya)JYp(9)0(Y)dY) =P- Since M(g, (pg/Ya) JYp<9></> (Y) dY) > 
M(g, pg/Ya) , dM/dg < 0 and dM/dt < 0, we have g1 > guv. Then 
YaM(g', t*) = YaM(guv, tuv) = p implies that t* < tuv. 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
First, we prove that given the existence of Yuv e (Y, Y) , all 
individuals with Y < Yuv chooses s = 0 and all individuals with Y 
> Yuv chooses s > 0. Given guv and tuv, an individual's utility 
maximization problem is: 
maxs>0 U(V(guv+s, (l-tuv)Y-ps) ,R(guv+s) ) (A9) 
The first-order conditions are that dU/ds > 0, s > 0 and s(dU/ds) 
= 0. By the definition of Yuv, dU/ds = 0 at s=0 and Y = Yuv. It 
can be verified that (d2U/dYds) > 0. Thus, for individuals whose 
Y < Yuv, dU/ds < 0 at s = 0, in which case their utility 
maximization choice is s = 0. Conversely, for individuals whose Y 
> Yuv dU/ds > 0 at s = 0, in which case their utility 
maximization choice is s > 0. 
Second, we establish that under the UV regime the individual 
with Y = Yp(g*) will choose s > o. To simplify notations in this 
proof we will use Yp as a shorthand notation for Y (g*) . Recall 
that Yp is the income level of the individual who, in the PP 
equilibrium, is indifferent between public education and private 
education. Hence Y satisfies: 
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U(V(g*,(l-t*)Yp) ,R(g*))=maxeU(V(e,(l-t*)Yp-pe) ,R(e)) ) 
Let ep be the solution to the maximization problem on the right-
hand side of (A10) . A necessary condition for (A10) to hold is 
that e > g*. 
Under the UV regime, the individual has an effective after-tax 
income of (l-tuv)Yp + pguv, which he can spend on education guv + s 
(s > 0) and the numeraire good x. Substituting tuv = pguv/Ya for 
tuv, we can re-write it as Yp - pguv(Yp - Ya)/Ya. On the other 
hand, the individual's after-tax income under the PP regime is (1-
t*)Yp, which after substituting the government budget constraint 
for t*, can be written as Yp - pg* (Yp/Ya) JYYp0(Y)dY. Since 
YpJYpY0(Y)dY < JypYY0(Y)dY < Ya, we have Yp - Ya < YpJYYp0 (Y) dY. 
This, along with that guv < g*, implies that (l-tuv) Yp(g*) + pguv 
> (l-t*)Y_(g*) . Thus, the individual has a higher effective after-
tax income under UV regime than under the PP regime. This implies 
that his consumption of education under the UV regime, guv + s 
exceeds g*. Since g* > guv, we have s > 0. 
Thus, we can conclude that Yuv should be less than Yp. On the 
other hand, we know that s=0 for the median voter whose income is 
Ycv. It follows that Yuv falls between Ycv and Yp(g*) . 
Proof of Proposition 5. 
If SDI holds, Ycv = Ym, which by proposition 2 implies Ym < Yuv. 
Thus, under both condition a) and condition b) of the proposition, 
Y < Y . In both cases, the bottom 50% of the population does not 
supplement their vouchers. Furthermore, under the UV regime g is 
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lower and t is higher than under the PP regime. They are worse off 
under the UV regime than under the PP regime. They will defeat the 
motion to replace PP regime with UV regime. 
Proof of Proposition 6. 
Given that Yc < Y (g) , the government budget constraint under the 
SV regime is the same as under the PP regime: tYa = pgJYp(g)0(Y)dY. 
Consider those individuals who receive vouchers. Their most 
preferred g and s are solved from: 
maxg>0,s>0 U(V(g+stY-J-pg[Yp{9)<f>(Y)dY-ps) ,R(g+s)) (All) 
The first order conditions to this problem are: 
|| = UvVe+URRf -UvVx(Y/Ya)MC(g) < 0; g>0; |^g=0 (A12) 
|£ = UvVe+URR'-UvVxp < 0; s>0; |Zs = 0 (A13) 
Since Yc < Ya and MC(g) < p, the most preferred choices of those 
who receive vouchers are such that g > 0 and s = 0. Given that no 
one will supplement the voucher he receives, there is no change in 
each individual's most preferred g if the PP regime is replaced by 
the SV regime. The median voter under the SV regime has the same 
income level as the median voter under the PP regime (i.e., Y ). 
He will choose the same level of public expenditure and tax rate, 
g* and t\ Hence, there is no change in both public expenditure 
and private expenditure on education if the PP regime is replaced 
by the SV regime. Everyone is indifferent between the two regimes. 
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Proof of Proposition 7. 
First, we prove that the SV regime will defeat the PP regime. The 
SV regime and the PP regime are the same in that the high income 
individuals still have to "pay twice" if they want to use private 
education. In the proof of Proposition 6 we have established that 
the median voter under the SV regime will not buy any supplements 
to the voucher he receives. Hence his optimization problem is 
exactly the same as (A3) . The value of g under the SV regime must 
satisfy the first-order condition: YaM(g, (pg/Ya) |Yp(g)0(Y) dY) = 
MC(g), where M(g,t) is defined in equation (2) and MC(g) in 
equation (3). Comparative statics on this condition reveals that 
dg_Ya(dM/dp)-(dMC/dp) 
"dp (dMC/dg)-Ya(dM/dg) 
Recall that dMC/dg > 0 by assumption, and that dM/dg < 0, dM/dt < 
0 and dM/dp < 0 because of diminishing marginal rate of 
substitution. From equation (3) it can be verified that dMC/dp > 
0. Therefore, dg/dp < 0. In other words, the reduction in p under 
the SV regime will lead to an increase in g, i.e., gsv > g . 
The reduction in p will change the tax rate as well. Use the 
government budget constraint we can rewrite the first-order 
condition to (A3) as YaM(g, (l-t)Y) = MC(g). To maintain this 
equality, t has to fall as g goes up. Hence tsv < t . 
Therefore, compared with the PP regime, the SV regime will 
bring a higher g and a lower tax rate. Individuals who use the 
public education prefer the SV regime to the PP regime. 
Individuals who use the private education also prefers the SV 
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regime to the PP regime because the SV regime entails a lower p and 
a lower t. Hence the SV regime will defeat the PP regime in a 
referendum. 
Second, we prove that SV regime defeats the UV regime under 
the conditions specified in the Proposition. Recall from the proof 
of Proposition 6 that given p, individuals are indifferent between 
the SV regime and the PP regime. From the proof of Proposition 5 
we know that given p, individuals whose Y < Yuv prefer the PP 
regime to UV regime. Therefore, given the same price p, these 
individuals also prefer the SV regime to the UV regime. Under 
either condition a) or condition b) , those individuals constitute 
a majority. Thus, the SV regime will defeat the UV regime. 
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